Topic:The Security of Link Signature: A Perspective from Channel Models

Time:2015年4月21日（周二）上午10:30-12:00

Venue:信电大楼-215学术厅

Speaker:Huaiyu Dai, Associated Professor

       Electrical and Computer Engineering

       North Carolina State University ，USA

Biography

Huaiyu Dai (M’03, SM’09) received the B.E. and M.S. degrees in electrical engineering from Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, in 1996 and 1998, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from Princeton University, Princeton, NJ in 2002. He was with Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies, Holmdel, NJ, during summer 2000, and with AT&T Labs-Research, Middletown, NJ, during summer 2001. Currently he is an Associate Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at NC State University, Raleigh. His research interests are in the general areas of communication systems and networks, advanced signal processing for digital communications, and communication theory and information theory. His current research focuses on networked information processing and cross layer design in wireless networks, cognitive radio networks, wireless security, and associated information-theoretic and computation-theoretic analysis.  He has served as an editor of IEEE Transactions on Communications, Signal Processing, and Wireless Communications. He co-edited two special issues of EURASIP journals on distributed signal processing techniques for wireless sensor networks, and on multiuser information theory and related applications, respectively. He co-chairs the Signal Processing for Communications Symposium of IEEE Globecom 2013, the Communications Theory Symposium of IEEE ICC 2014, and the Wireless Communications Symposium of IEEE Globecom 2014.

Abstract

Motivated by information-theoretic security, link signature (LS) based security mechanisms exploit the ample channel characteristics between wireless devices for security establishment. Nevertheless, LS is originated from wireless environments and hence may exhibit potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversary in the vicinity. As to this, it is widely believed in existing literature of LS that, a half-wavelength guard zone is sufficient to decorrelate the adversary channel from the legitimate one and thereby secures the legitimate LS. However, such an assumption may not hold universally -- in some environments, high channel correlations have been observed for even much larger spatial separations. Considering this, a comprehensive understanding of channel correlation in different wireless environments is needed for more confident deployment of LS based security mechanisms. To this end, various well-established channel correlation models are investigated in this work. A set of important physical factors that have significant influence on LS security are identified, and with the obtained insights, extensive simulations are conducted to explore suitable guard zone sizes for LS in several typical indoor and outdoor environments. Experimental results based on Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) platforms and GNURadio are also presented to further support the analysis.